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The Enlightenment revival of the Epicurean history
of language and civilisation
AVI S. LIFSCHITZ
Eighteenth-century thinkers renowned as physicists, mathematicians,
political economists, aestheticians and theologians all took part in
intense debates over the emergence of language as a social phenomenon
and a cognitive tool. A very selective list of authors of essays on the origin
of language would include Condillac, Diderot, Turgot, Smith, Rousseau
and Herder. Language might have been the domain where crucial topics
could be put to the test less dangerously than in other fields, as the issues
involved in discussions of the origin of language were similar to those
preoccupying authors of treatises on ethics, revealed religion and poli-
tics: human agency in relation to providence and grace, natural emer-
gence versus supernatural formation, or convention and arbitrariness
compared to pre-established social values and cultural meanings.
Language also played a major role in enquiries into the origins of society
as a prerequisite for the emergence of politics, commerce, the arts and
the sciences; discussions of the origin of language exemplified contem-
porary attempts to draw the fine line between the natural and the
artificial (or socially developed) traits of man.
A common presupposition in most works on the topic was that
language did have an origin, divine or natural. According to Genesis, it
was God who endowed Adam with language; this perfect idiom, in which
Adam named the beasts according to their nature, gave rise to early
modern attempts to recuperate or recreate a universal language
reflecting the essence of things. Towards the end of the seventeenth
century Adam’s wisdom and his linguistic capacity were increasingly
questioned, and an alternative account came to the fore: that of mute
human beings, naturally arising from the depths of the earth, creating
language and extending their mental operations with no supernatural
assistance. This narrative was closely modelled on the ancient Epicurean
account of the emergence of language, a pivotal tenet of a more general
history of civilisation. The revival of this ancient thesis of linguistic
origins had significant implications in contemporary discussions of the
evolution of human society and culture.
This article begins with a brief introduction of the ancient scene,
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where Plato’s mythical name-givers were to Epicurus what Adam’s per-
fect language would be to Enlightenment Epicureans. I shall then
examine the first of two vital aspects of the revival of the Epicurean
history of language, namely the attempt to fuse the ancient naturalist
theory with the biblical narrative of a supernatural creation. Closer
attention will be paid to the second axis of the Epicurean revival,
attempts to clarify the difficult transition from natural signs to arbitrary
words. The incommensurability of these two categories persistently
haunted Enlightenment thinkers such as Condillac, Rousseau and
Mendelssohn. Even if projected over a long span of time, the passage
from the natural to the artificial was deemed problematic if not inex-
plicable. This challenge was closely paralleled in social theory, ethics and
natural law: in all these domains, the transition from barbarism to
civilisation challenged Enlightenment thinkers to reconcile the natural
and essential with the historical and contingent. After a presentation of
the theoretical impasse confronting the Epicurean history of language
around the middle of the eighteenth century, the final part of this essay
reviews tentative contemporary solutions.
Contesting supernatural origins: Epicurus and his
predecessors on language
The aversion of some Enlightenment thinkers to direct divine inter-
vention in human affairs, or to a supernatural fiat at the beginning of
history, had its parallel in the ancient world. Epicurus of Samos rewrote
existing accounts of the origins of natural phenomena and human
institutions, seeking to limit the inexplicable and the extraordinary.
Unnatural rational agencies were denied a constitutive role in the
evolution of civilisation. Myths of miraculous creation were thus reduced
in Epicurean philosophy tominimal human discoveries or traced back to
simple causes, such as natural effects and instinctive reactions, developed
over time into more complex objects, customs and mental operations.1
On the question of the genesis of language, Epicurus directly
confronted Plato – or at least what had been widely perceived as the
latter’s view of the origin of language. Several of the crucial problems
tackled by Enlightenment thinkers had already been discussed in detail
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1. For the relationship between the Epicurean and other ancient ‘rationalist’ traditions, see
Thomas Cole, Democritus and the sources of Greek anthropology (Cleveland, OH, 1967); on
possible sources for Epicurus’ history of language, see Alexander Verlinsky, ‘Epicurus and
his predecessors on the origin of language’, in Language and learning: philosophy of language in
the Hellenistic age, ed. Dorothea Frede and Brian Inwood (Cambridge, 2005), p.56-100.
More generally on ancient, medieval and early modern accounts of the origins of
language, see Arno Borst, Der Turmbau von Babel, 4 vols in 6 (Stuttgart, 1957-1963).
in Plato’s dialogue Cratylus, particularly the arbitrariness of the linguistic
sign and the extent to which language represented reality. As in some
other Platonic dialogues, in Cratylus Socrates promoted a compromise
between his interlocutors by confronting them with logical impasses. To
Hermogenes’ theory of the complete arbitrariness of words (signs having
no fixed relation to the things they denote), Socrates retorted that this
would have rendered communication impossible. Even without a deeper
connection between words and things, Socrates argued, human beings
must rely on fixed meanings in their use of language if they wish to be
understood. The Socratic reply was more nuanced in the case of
Cratylus’ thesis that words perfectly reflected the nature of denoted
objects. According to Socrates, this would have logically entailed an
identity between words and things (upon uttering ‘my dog’ we would
necessarily see that particular dog; complete imitation of a thing would
result in its actual duplication rather than in its representation).2
Socrates pointed out that etymologically some sounds had natural
meanings, but it would be difficult to generalise from such examples
because sound patterns were inconsistent. Though words might nat-
urally correspond to reality, as they could have done initially, Socrates
unwillingly admitted that convention did play a role in the daily function
of language.3
To account for the desirable congruence between words and things,
Socrates appealed to name-givers, mythical heroes or demigods who
might have set the basic rules and first vocabularies of languages. Just as
laws had to be drafted by knowledgeable lawgivers, according to Plato,
language and naming were a specialised craft to be mastered only by the
wise and the skilful.4 Each language had at its origin a legendary name-
giver who directly perceived reality and coined names correspondingly.
Subsequent historical evolution introduced convention and arbitrary
changes into the history of language until it reached its present unsat-
isfactory condition.
Though Cratylus’ vision of a perfect correlation between words and
things was found impracticable, in the ideal language words would
indeed reflect the essence of things, as pre-conceived wisely by a
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2. Plato, Cratylus, translated by C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis, IN, 1999), 432d, p.82.
3. ‘I myself prefer the view that names should be as much like things as possible, but I fear
that defending this view is like hauling a ship up a sticky ramp, as Hermogenes suggested,
and that we have to make use of this worthless thing, convention, in the correctness of
names’ (Cratylus, 435c, p.87).
4. ‘It follows that it is not every man who can give names, Hermogenes, but only a name-
maker, and he, it seems, is a rule-setter – the kind of craftsman most rarely found among
human beings’ (Cratylus, 388e-389a, p.11).
name-giver. Demonstrating Plato’s general distinction between corrupt
earthly imitations and perfect heavenly forms, his Cratylus contrasted
daily language, full of ‘this worthless thing, convention’, with a perfect
language correctly reflecting the essence of things, a real instrument of
knowledge devised by a mythical figure.5 Aristotle, on the contrary, was
not so disturbed by the conventional features of language; in part 2 of On
interpretation, Aristotle went as far as arguing that names signifed only by
convention. There were no such things as natural meanings directly
linking words and objects.6
The ancient Epicureans found both views wanting. The Aristotelian
theory, they argued, did not explain the emergence of language: how
could there be any mutual accord about the meaning of words if
language had not already existed to enable such an agreement? The
alternative account of mythical name-giving made no sense within the
Epicurean framework, where civilisation gradually emerged over time. In
Epicurus’ ‘Letter to Herodotus’, language originated in a two-pronged
process: an animal-like expression of feelings and impressions was
followed by the conscious modification of the initial sounds to dis-
tinguish between different objects, to clarify references, and eventually
to denote abstract entities. In this account, the initial cries and gestures
differed among human tribes or races according to particular circum-
stances and environments. The same tree would have been denoted by
different sounds if it had first been encountered in the desert, next to a
waterfall, surrounded by sheep or in the midst of a thunderstorm. After
some time and due to social interaction, human beings grew used to such
sounds as names for the corresponding objects (mostly related to sharp
perceptions such as ‘pain’, ‘horse’, ‘red’, ‘cold’). Only later was human
convention introduced into this process: after knowledge had been
gradually accumulated, language became enriched by analogy, abstract
terms and additional categories (pronouns, prepositions).7
210 Avi S. Lifschitz
5. Recent interpretations have questioned the common reading of Cratylus as advocating the
‘mimetic principle’ of a strong correspondence between words and things. See particu-
larly BernardWilliams, ‘Cratylus’ theory of names and its refutation’, in Language and logos,
ed. Malcolm Schofield and Martha Nussbaum (Cambridge, 1982), p.83-93. Most early
modern readers, however, as will be argued below, saw Plato’s dialogue as endorsing a
natural link between words and things. This may also be attributed to the Stoic
interpretation of Cratylus; see A. A. Long, Hellenistic philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics
(Berkeley, CA, and Los Angeles, 1974), p.131-39.
6. ‘We have already said that a noun signifies this or that by convention. No sound is by
nature a noun: it becomes one, becoming a symbol. Inarticulate soundsmean something –
for instance, those made by brute beasts. But no noises of this kind are nouns’, Aristotle,
The Organon I: The Categories, On interpretation, Prior analytics, translated by Harold Cook and
Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, MA, 1938), p.117.
7. ‘Thus names too did not originally come into being by coining, but men’s own natures
underwent feelings and received impressions which varied particularly from tribe to
Though differing substantially from Plato and Aristotle’s accounts,
Epicurus’ history of language also combined central features from both.
The Cratylian advocates of a natural link between words and things could
be placated by Epicurus’ opinion that words did not emerge arbitrarily;
initially, sounds did have natural meanings.8 Human convention, how-
ever, played a major role in the Epicurean account beyond the level of
quasi-bestial communication, and there was no room for name-givers,
rule-setters or lawgivers of any kind. This became the crux of Lucretius’
version of the emergence of language in De rerum natura, book 5.
Therefore to suppose that someone then distributed names amongst things,
and that from him men learnt their first words, is folly. For why should he
have been able to mark all things with titles and to utter the various sounds
of the tongue, and at the same time others not be thought able to have done
it? Besides, if others had not also used these terms in their intercourse,
whence was that foreknowledge of usefulness implanted in him, and whence
did he first gain such power, as to know what he wanted to do and to see it in
his mind’s eye?9
Lucretius highlighted the paradoxical implications of the invention of
language by a name-giver. In order for such a person or demigod to
communicate with human beings, some rudimentary form of language
must have already existed. But if this had been the case, there would have
been no need at all for language to be miraculously invented. Moreover,
if necessity had been at stake, each and every one of the primitive human
beings could have equally invented language.
The Epicurean theory of the origin of language made room for both
convention and a primordial connection between words and things,
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tribe, and each of the individual feelings and impressions caused them to exhale breath
peculiarly, according also to the racial differences from place to place. Later, particular
coinings were made by consensus within the individual races, so as to make the desig-
nations less ambiguous andmore concisely expressed’, Epicurus, ‘Letter to Herodotus’, in
The Hellenistic philosophers, translated by A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, vol.1 (Cambridge,
1987), p.97.
8. ‘Natural’ could have different senses in relation to linguistic meaning or to the origin of
language. ‘Natural meaning’ entailed a connection between word and nature (contrary to
mere convention), while ‘natural emergence’ referred to the human development of
language with no supernatural aid. As will be elaborated below, theories of natural
emergence usually included an initial stage at which words had natural meanings, later
overlain by convention and arbitrariness.
9. Lucretius, De rerum natura, ed. Martin Ferguson Smith, translated by W. H. D. Rouse
(Cambridge, MA, 1982), V.1041-1055, p.459-61. See also the Epicurean inscription of
Diogenes of Oenoanda: ‘For it is absurd, indeed absurder than any absurdity, not to
mention impossible, that someone should have all on his own have assembled all those
multitudes [...] – and having assembled them, instructed them like a schoolteacher,
holding a rod, and touching each thing have said ‘‘Let this be called ‘stone’, this ‘stick’,
this ‘man’, or ‘dog’’’’ (Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic philosophers, vol.1, p.98).
while simultaneously accounting for the diversity of languages. Unlike
early modern Hermeticists, Cabbalists and Paracelsians who tried to
recover a single perfect language, the ancient Epicureans believed there
was a natural link between reality and language in all human tongues.
Due to environmental and physical differences between tribes, their
feelings and impressions were likely to prompt distinct sounds in various
contexts. Therefore, simple nouns and verbs enjoyed a natural meaning
in each language, though over time it became superimposed by meta-
phorical and abstract senses. It was particularly the historical perspective
added by Epicurus and Lucretius to a theory of natural origin that
allowed for a measure of contingency to emerge in the further evolution
of language. This creative hypothesis, a third way between linguistic
conventionality and a supernatural congruence between words and
things, re-emerged in the early modern period in attempts to reconcile
a natural history of language with the biblical account of Adamic name-
giving.10
Historicising Adam’s words: how to marry
Epicurus and Genesis
The evolution of language was a central component of the Epicurean
history of mankind, where human beings naturally emerged from the
earth and developed civilisation on their own. It seems there could have
been no greater contrast between such a narrative and the biblical one,
where man was supernaturally created, commanding a language that
reflected the essence of things. Early modern observations of nature and
man seemed to contradict the existence of a perfect human being at the
starting point of history; Isaac La Peyre`re, for example, argued for the
existence of men before Adam in his Praeadamitae (1655) – to the fury of
orthodox theologians.11 If one wished tomaintain the biblical account of
Creation, the alternative was to relativise the significance and wisdom of
Adam.
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10. My discussion has been deliberately limited to the issue of nature and convention in the
origin of language. On this topic, and on the more general Epicurean theory of meaning,
see Stephen Everson, ‘Epicurus on mind and language’, in Companions to ancient thought,
vol.3: Language, ed. S. Everson (Cambridge, 1994), p.74-108; Jonathan Barnes, ‘Epicurus:
meaning and thinking’, in Epicureismo greco e romano, ed. Gabriele Giannantoni and
Marcello Gigante, 3 vols (Naples, 1996), vol.1, p.197-220; Gordon Campbell, Lucretius on
creation and evolution: a commentary on De rerum natura book V, lines 772-1104 (Oxford, 2003);
Brooke Holmes, ‘Daedala lingua: crafted speech in De rerum natura’, American journal of
philology 126 (2005), p.527-85.
11. Richard Popkin, Isaac La Peyre`re (1596-1676): his life, work and influence (Leiden, 1987); Alain
Schnapp, ‘The Pre-adamites: an abortive attempt to invent pre-history in the seventeenth
century?’, inHistory of scholarship, ed. Christopher Ligota and Jean-Louis Quantin (Oxford,
2006), p.399-412.
The downgrading of Adam’s mental capacities entailed the question-
ing of the status of his language, in which he allegedly named the beasts
according to their nature (Genesis 2.19-20).12 For Thomas Hobbes, man’s
characteristic faculties were acquired over time, gradually laying the
foundations for culture, science and social interaction. By seeing
language as an artificial construct, naturally developed by human beings,
Hobbes implicitly criticised in Leviathan (1651) contemporary views of
Adam’s perfect idiom. Though he paid tribute to Genesis in his account
of the origin of language, Adam appeared there as God’s problematic
pupil rather than a wise name-giver.
The first author of Speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to
name such creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth no
further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to add more
names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion;
and to join them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood;
and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had
found use for; though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need
of. For I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by
consequence can be gathered, that Adamwas taught the names of all Figures,
Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies, Relations [...].13
According to Hobbes, God was still the ‘author of speech’ but creation
endowed Adam with rudimentary faculties to be perfected by mankind
itself over time, especially after the confusion of tongues at Babel.
A similar argument was made by Samuel Pufendorf in De jure naturae et
gentium (1672). Conceding that Adam might have named animals and
things according to their essences, Pufendorf suggested that the basic
elements of Adam’s own words were arbitrary.14 In all languages,
Pufendorf observed, ‘things allied by nature are usually allied by name’,
but this did notmean that their names were perfect or divine. In line with
his emphasis on the conventional and even contractual origin of
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12. For early modern views of Adam’s language, see Hans Aarsleff, ‘The rise and decline of
Adam and his Ursprache’, in The Language of Adam – Die Sprache Adams, ed. Allison Coudert
(Wiesbaden, 1999), p.277-95.
13. ThomasHobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. RichardTuck (Cambridge, 1996), ch.4, p.24-25. In De
homine (1658) Hobbes suggested that Adam could have imposed some names on animals,
but he simultaneously problematised this assertion by pointing out that after the
confusion of tongues at Babel ‘the origins of languages are diverse and have been brought
by single men to single peoples’. In all these languages names never corresponded to the
nature of things; Hobbes, Man and citizen, translated by C. T. Wood, T. S. K. Scott-Craig
and B. Gert (Indianapolis, IN, 1991), ch.10, p.38-39.
14. ‘For although we should grant that the Names set on Animals, and some other things (for
noMan can easily prove this of all,) were such as denoted their Genius and Disposition, or
their principal Affection; yet those very Primitives whence these Names were derived,
signify merely at Pleasure’, Pufendorf, Of the law of nature and nations, translated by Basil
Kennett (Oxford, A. and J. Churchill, 1710), book 4, ch.1, p.249, original emphases.
language, Pufendorf espoused explicitly a version ofHermogenes’ view of
the arbitrariness of the sign in Plato’s Cratylus. This entailed a clear
rejection of the invention of language either byGodor by a humanname-
giver.
Richard Simon too criticised a supernatural interpretation of Genesis,
claiming that the biblical account could be read in a naturalist way. In his
Histoire critique du vieux testament (1678) Simon quoted Epicurus, Lucretius,
Diodorus of Sicily and Gregory of Nyssa against the divine origin of
language. Equating nature and human reason, Simon explained that God
created things, not words to denote them; all languages arose through
‘reasonable nature’. His assault on supernatural agencies at the origin of
language was completed by turning Plato’s name-givers into metaphor-
ical images of human reason. Like Pufendorf, Simon infused Genesis
with ancient authors in order to claim there was no contradiction
between the biblical account and a natural emergence of language.15
John Locke mentioned the biblical account of language origin not so
much as a disguise for a naturalist history, but as an introduction to his
examination of the operations of language. At the beginning of book 3
(‘On words’) of his Essay concerning human understanding (1689), Locke
briefly noted that man was created speaking and sociable, endowed by
God with a capacity for language. This endowment was similar to the
very basic instrument depicted by Hobbes: God did not give human
beings actual words and ideas.16 There is no detailed account in the Essay
of the unfolding of language throughout history, as Locke’s aim differed
from that of eighteenth-century followers of his sensualist psychology,
particularly in France. Wishing to combat contemporary beliefs in a
perfect accord between words and things, Locke emphasised the
arbitrariness of signs, demonstrating the dependence of words on ideas
formed in an individual’s mind rather than on any correct taxonomy of
nature.17
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15. Richard Simon, Histoire critique du vieux testament, suivant la copie imprime´e a` Paris,
(Amsterdam, Elzevir, 1680), vol.1, ch.14-15, p.92-101. For further ancient accounts of a
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with Language, which was to be the great Instrument, and common Tye of Society. Man
therefore had by Nature his Organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame articulate Sounds, which
we call Words. But this was not enough to produce Language’, John Locke, An Essay
concerning human understanding (1690), ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1979), III.i.1, p.402.
17. H. Aarsleff, ‘Leibniz on Locke on language’, American philosophical quarterly 1 (1964), p.165-
88; Hannah Dawson, Locke, language and early modern philosophy (Cambridge, 2007).
A contemporary of Locke tackling the same problem was Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz, who rejected the strict dichotomy between naturalness
and conventionalism in language. Like others who wished to overcome
this ancient tension, Leibniz followed Epicurus’ lead. He argued that
human beings created words according to sense impressions, employing
an analogy between the acoustic properties of things and the signs used
to denote them. The psychological and environmental circumstances of
this act of naming introduced a contingent element into the natural
process. Leibniz’s Epicurean theory thus allowed languages to retain
natural residues while accounting for the different names an object
could have in different languages. Since similar circumstances were likely
to yield the same responses among the first human beings, some original
roots might still be recovered from under the ages of evolution and
change.18
Bernard Mandeville in The Fable of the bees (two volumes: 1723 and 1729)
did not even try to clothe his Epicurean account of the origin of language
with the biblical narrative. Without mentioning Adam, the deluge or the
Tower of Babel, Mandeville projected his history of language onto a large
temporal canvas, where emotive cries and gestures gradually turned into
articulate speech. As in Lucretius and Hobbes, this process must have
occurred naturally.19 Though themain goal of the invention of speech in
Mandeville’s treatise was deception and domination rather than social
communication, his Fable contributed to the propagation of the Epi-
curean account of the origin of language in eighteenth-century Britain
and France (it was translated into French in 1740 and immediately
banned).20
Giambattista Vico, on a very different intellectual terrain, attempted
in his own manner to reconcile Scripture and a naturalist account of the
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18. ‘It is impossible to say that there is a sure and determinate connection between things and
words. But neither is the connection purely arbitrary. [...] Nevertheless, languages have a
certain natural source, namely the harmony between sounds and affections which the
sight of things excites in the mind’, Leibniz, ‘De connexione inter res et verba, seu potius
de linguarum origine’ (n.d.), in Opuscules et fragments ine´dits de Leibniz, ed. Louis Couturat
(Paris, 1903), p.151-52; translated by Marcelo Dascal in Leibniz: language, signs and thought
(Amsterdam, 1987), p.189. See also Stefano Gensini, ‘De linguis in universum’: on Leibniz’s
ideas on languages (Mu¨nster, 2000), p.43-96.
19. ‘Horatio: But if the old Stock would never either be able or willing to acquire Speech, it is
impossible they could teach it their Children: Then which way could any Language come
into theWorld from two Savages? Cleomenes: By slow degrees, as all other Arts and Sciences
have done, and length of time; Agriculture, Physick, Astronomy, Architecture, Painting,
&c.’, Mandeville, The Fable of the bees, or Private vices, publick benefits (1729), ed. F. B. Kaye, 2
vols (Oxford, 1924), vol.2, p.287. See also E. J. Hundert, ‘The thread of language and the
web of dominion: Mandeville to Rousseau and back’, Eighteenth-century studies 21 (1987-
1988), p.169-91.
20. F. B. Kaye’s introduction in Mandeville, Fable of the bees, vol.1, p.cxvi.
emergence of civilisation. In his Scienza nuova (three editions: 1725, 1730,
1748) he placed the long ages of transition from barbarism to culture
after the deluge, so as not to compromise Adam’s wisdom and perfect
language. Furthermore, the ancient Hebrews were excluded from the
general dispersion and descent into bestial existence in order to save the
uniqueness of their revealed history. For all other nations, the postdi-
luvian condition was the starting point of a quasi-Epicurean evolution.
Human beings with an elementary understanding imagined their gods
and simultaneously created language, ascribing divinely animate names
to the most striking phenomena. Vico’s emphasis on ‘gentile humanity’
maintained his distinction between the biblical account of Jewish history
and the Epicurean emergence of all other nations. According to Vico,
only Hebrew resembled Adam’s perfect language, bearing no traces of
the polytheistic imagination and mythical thought.21
Beyond Mandeville’s Fable of the bees, another English essay exerting
profound influence in eighteenth-century France was, perhaps seren-
dipitously, The Divine legation of Moses by William Warburton (two vol-
umes: 1738 and 1741). Condillac, Rousseau, Voltaire and authors of
articles in the Encyclope´die all referred to Warburton’s work, exalting its
account of the origin of language and the evolution of writing systems.
Unfortunately, it was almost the only aspect of the work with which they
were acquainted through the partial translation by Marc Antoine
Le´onard des Malpeines, published in 1744. Though The Divine legation
had been planned as a refutation of Spinoza and Toland and a vindi-
cation of the exceptionality of Hebraic history, its French version was
focused on book 4 of Warburton’s work, in which he attacked the
hypothesis that the ancient Egyptians concealed esoteric wisdom in their
hieroglyphs (the French title was, accordingly, Essai sur les hie´roglyphes des
Egyptiens). Divorced from its theological context, The Divine legation could
be read as one amongst other Enlightenment essays on the natural
transition from barbarism to civilisation.
According to Warburton, Egyptian hieroglyphs were not at all sources
of recondite knowledge; they constituted a primitive form of writing by
images, intended for popular use and arising out of necessity. Warburton
outlined a natural history of language and thought, where the shift from
‘speech by action’ (gesture, mime) to articulate sounds corresponded to
the modification of written forms from images (hieroglyphs) to analogy
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21. ‘For that first language, spoken by the theological poets, was not a language in accord with
the nature of things that it dealt with (as must have been the sacred language invented by
Adam, to whom God granted divine onomathesia, the giving of names according to the
nature of each), but was a fantastic speech making use of physical substances endowed
with life and most of them imagined to be divine’, Vico, The New science, translated by
Thomas Bergin and Max Fisch (Ithaca, NY, 1984), p.127-28.
(Chinese characters) and later convention (phonetic alphabets).22
According to Warburton, the first human beings used concrete images
as their symbols just as they spoke in fables before moving on to similes
and metaphors. This process occurred unconsciously, aided by nature,
custom and practice. Only later, following the development of a pho-
netic alphabet, did Egyptian priests appropriate the old hieroglyphic
system and attribute to it secret truths in order to dominate the people.
In a somewhat cumbersome manner, the refutation of the uniqueness of
Egyptian religion was supposed to emphasise the workings of providence
in the history of the ancient Jews. Warburton combined his view of Egypt
with an acknowledgement that the Old Testament lacked a system of
future rewards and punishments, usually deemed an indispensable fea-
ture of all societies, which allegedly proved the providential exception of
God’s chosen people. In France, however, The Divine legation was received
as an attempt to reconcile the biblical narrative with the Epicurean
history of language in the tradition of Thomas Hobbes and Richard
Simon.
The Epicurean narrative of a natural emergence from bestiality into
culture appealed to thinkers such as Vico andWarburton, who wished to
uphold religious orthodoxy while taking into account scientific devel-
opments and reports on distant civilisations. But reservations and
modifications had to be applied to Epicurean prehistory if it was to
attain respectability. Not the least among such changes to the Epicurean
account was its divorce from other aspects of the ancient philosophical
school: materialism, atomism, atheism and their ethical implications.
The Epicurean history of civilisation was thus inserted into the narrative
of Genesis after the deluge and the Tower of Babel. This postulation of
long ages of barbarism at the dawn of history did not necessarily require
the diminution of Adam’s wisdom and his perfect language, though this
was usually part of the fusion between Genesis and Epicurus.
From the natural to the conventional:
the trouble with Epicurus
Warburton and Vico employed certain Epicurean elements to reassert
Scriptural authority, but the opposite could occur as well: authors who
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22. ‘Language, as appears both from Records of Antiquity, and the Nature of the Thing, was
at first extremely rude, narrow, and equivocal; [...] Use and Custom, as in most other
Circumstances of Life improving what arose out of Necessity, into Ornament, this Practice
subsisted long after the Necessity had ceased’, William Warburton, The Divine legation of
Moses, 2nd edn, 2 vols (London, printed for the executor ofMr. FletcherGyles, 1742), vol.2,
book 4, p.82-83. See also the influential translation: WilliamWarburthon [sic], Essai sur les
hie´roglyphes des Egyptiens, translated by Marc Antoine Le´onard des Malpeines, 2 vols (Paris,
Hippolyte-Louis Guerin, 1744), vol.1, p.48-52.
advanced naturalist and materialist systems sometimes retained the
biblical chronology in a careful attempt to demonstrate their orthodoxy.
This was particularly apparent in the case of Etienne Bonnot de
Condillac. In his Essai sur l’origine des connoissances humaines (1746), he
referred toWarburton as a reliable authority in order to distance himself
from heresy. Quoting Warburton’s view of Adam’s intellectual capacities
as ‘sterile and limited’, Condillac (like Vico before him) used the deluge
as the solution to the apparent contradiction between Epicurus and
Genesis. As an abbe´, Condillac might have particularly felt the need to
declare he was ‘authorised’ to pursue the naturalist hypothesis by
positioning it after the deluge.23
Condillac’s Essai exemplified the contemporary device of an apparent
reverence of the biblical narrative, accompanied by its circumvention
and historicisation. The status of Adam’s language no longer bothered
Condillac and his contemporaries; it became irrelevant through a non-
chalant reference to the deluge as the starting point of real (or Epi-
curean) history. Jean-Jacques Rousseau employed the samemethod in his
Essai sur l’origine des langues (1756-1761, published posthumously in 1781).
He noted that, although Adam and Noah possessed language, the
relevant beginning of human history was the ages of savagery following
the deluge. According to Rousseau, this combination of the epicuro-
Lucretian narrative with the biblical version was the only way to rec-
oncile Scriptural authority with ‘the monuments of antiquity’.24 In this
manner, the conflicting accounts of human history in Epicurus and
Genesis seemed to have been successfully merged by the mid-eighteenth
century. But neither Rousseau nor Condillac could resolve another
serious problem raised by the revival of the Epicurean history of
language and civilsation: the transition from the natural to the conven-
tional.
In Condillac’s Essai, language was not only a human achievement
emerging through a slow civilising process; it was the very prerequisite
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23. ‘Adam and Eve did not owe the exercise of the operations of their soul to experience. As
they came from the hands of God, they were able, by special assistance, to reflect and
communicate their thoughts to each other. But I am assuming that two children, one of
either sex, sometime after the deluge, had gotten lost in the desert before they would have
known the use of any sign. The fact I have just related gives me the right to make this
assumption’, Condillac, Essay on the origin of human knowledge, translated by Hans Aarsleff
(Cambridge, 2001), II.1, p.113.
24. ‘Adam spoke; Noah spoke; granted. [...] Scattered throughout this vast desert of a world,
[after the deluge] men relapsed into the dull barbarism they would have been in if they
had been born of the earth. By following these entirely natural ideas it is easy to reconcile
the authority of Scripture with ancient records, and there is no need to treat as fables
traditions that are as old as are the peoples that have handed them down to us’, Rousseau,
‘Essay on the origin of languages’, in The Discourses and other early political writings, translated
by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge, 1997), p.270-71.
for the development of the mind, social life and all forms of culture.
Through the mutual evolution of language and thought, human society
acquired a historical perspective on itself, since language allowed ex-
perience to be accumulated and transmitted to posterity. At the heart of
this account stood, however, a serious problem harking back to the
Epicurean response to Plato’s Cratylus: the combination of naturalism
with a diachronic viewpoint. Historical development gave rise to a
measure of contingency, whereas a natural origin of language entailed
an initial link between words and things beyond arbitrariness or con-
vention.
Condillac seems to have been well aware of this tension between
natural origins and historical evolution. In the Essai, he distinguished
between three classes of signs: natural signs instinctively expressed
emotions such as joy and pain (they ceased to be natural once
deliberately used); accidental signs revived unconsciously some ideas
under particular circumstances; and instituted signs had ‘an arbitrary
relation to our ideas’.25 Only such signs could grant man consciousness
and command of his cognitive faculties. The first ‘instituted’ (or conven-
tional) signs were introduced on the basis of a vividly gesticular ‘language
of action’, the original means of communication through natural signs.
With the introduction of the first conventional signs, the same idea could
be denoted in various ways according to the different circumstances
under which it had been first encountered. All languages thus exhibited
an initial relation between signs and things (in the Epicurean manner),
which might have been lost under layers of human convention.
Already in the Essai of 1746 Condillac identified the transition from
nature to arbitrariness as a potential paradox: how could human beings
use conventional signs if they had no command of the required mental
capacities – which, in turn, depended on the use of conventional signs?26
Condillac’s solution was to be found in history. Frequent repetition
made the use of natural signs a habit, even in the absence of the
accompanying objects and circumstances. Human beings eventually
came to do by reflection what they had initially done by instinct.27
Instead of clarifying the shift from natural signs to arbitrary ones,
however, this suggestion merely projected the transition onto a large
temporal sweep.
Condillac made another attempt to explain the change from the
natural to the arbitrary in his Grammaire (1775), where conventional
signs were rechristened as ‘artificial’. Themodification of such signs from
‘arbitrary’ (in 1746) to ‘artificial’ (in 1775) was meant to address the
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25. Condillac, Essay, I.2.4, p.36.
26. Condillac, Essay, I.2.5, p.42.
27. Condillac, Essay, II.1, p.114-17.
apparent incommensurability between natural sounds on the one hand
and conventional or ‘instituted’ signs on the other. Condillac argued that
complete arbitrariness was impossible in language, as words had to be
understood by the primitive users of natural signs; human intelligence
did not allow for pure chance in this domain.28 This distinction between
‘arbitrary’ and ‘artificial’ was made after three decades of intense debate
over Condillac’s Epicurean account of the history of language. The main
objections did not concern the reconciliation of Genesis with De rerum
natura, or of Adam’s perfect language with the initial silence of Lucretian
brutes. Critics across Europe levelled their attack at what they perceived
as the most vulnerable point of the ancient naturalist thesis and its
modern versions: the supposedly smooth transition between two dis-
similar categories. No projection over time could merge together in-
commensurable classes of signs, the objection went, for at some point a
qualitative leap must be assumed from the natural to the arbitrary.
Against Epicurus: towards innatism and back to
supernaturalism
At the vanguard of such criticism was, perhaps unsurprisingly, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. Though perfectly at ease with the first aspect of the
revival of the Epicurean thesis (ages of barbarism inserted into the
biblical account), Rousseau cast serious doubt on the naturalist view of
the emergence of language. He drew on Condillac’s own questioning of
the shift from cries and gestures to articulate sounds (either ‘arbitrary’ or
‘artificial’), refusing to recognise slow evolution over time as a solution.
In his Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’ine´galite´ parmi les hommes
(1755), Rousseau saw the projection of this transition over a long
prehistory as an elegant way to eschew a challenging paradox. The
introduction of conventional words required, according to Rousseau,
abstraction (thinking in general terms) and a social framework. At the
same time, however, language was deemed an essential prerequisite for
both conceptual generalisation and the foundation of society.29 In the
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28. ‘Remarquez bien, Monseigneur, que jue dis de signes artificiels, & que je ne dis pas de signes
arbitraries: car il ne faudroit pas confondre ces deux choses. En effet, qu’est-ce que des
signes arbitraires? Des signes choisis sans raison & par caprice. Il ne seroient donc pas
entendus. Au contraire, des signes artificiels sont des signes dont le choix est fonde´ en
raison: il doivent eˆtre imagine´s avec tel art, que l’intelligence en soit pre´pare´e par les
signes qui sont connus.’ Condillac, Cours d’e´tude pour l’instruction du prince de Parme, vol.1:
Grammaire (Geneva, Franc¸ois Dufart, and Lyon, Bruyset Fre`res, 1789), p.112; original
emphases.
29. ‘[E]ven if it were understood how the sounds of voice came to be taken for the
conventional interpreters of our ideas, it would still leave open the question of what
could have been the interpreters of that convention for ideas which, having no sensible
Discours of 1755, Rousseau’s long discussion of the origin of language
ended with complete resignation. This was not merely the recognition of
a personal failure to explain the shift from the natural to the arbitrary in
language; it was read, and probably written, as a crucial challenge to all
naturalist attempts to account for the emergence of language ‘by purely
human means’.30
Two contemporary examples in France and Prussia testify to the
salience of the debate over convention and arbitrariness in language,
following Rousseau’s problematisation of the Epicurean theory. Nicolas
Beauze´e, the prolific author of grammatical entries in the Encyclope´die,
constructed his own refutation of the naturalist thesis around Rousseau’s
comments, which he quoted at length. Given the conundrums identified
by Rousseau at the core of the Epicurean account, Beauze´e drew the
conclusion that language must have been divinely pre-programmed into
human nature. Beauze´e proceeded one step further, focusing on the
switch from nature to arbitrariness. If language and society must have
conditioned each other’s emergence, and if language could not have
emerged ‘by purely human means’, Beauze´e asked Rousseau to admit
that human society too must have been created by God.31
As a grammairien-philosophe Beauze´e was likely to find Rousseau’s com-
ments on language a particularly valuable component of the Discours sur
l’ine´galite´. But in Berlin, Moses Mendelssohn was similarly fascinated by
Rousseau’s problematisation of the Epicurean history of language when
he undertook the translation of the Discours into German. Mendelssohn
addressed Rousseau’s conundrums in a ‘Letter to Magister Lessing in
Leipzig’ which he appended to his translation. There Mendelssohn tried
to vindicate the natural emergence of language by original examples of
the transition from natural signs to arbitrary words, but he too invoked
the large span of time during which the smallest changes must have
occurred.32 Rousseau had already rejected the reduction of the shift
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object, could not be pointed to by gesture or by voice, so that it is scarcely possible to form
tenable conjectures about the origin of this Art of communicating one’s thoughts’,
Rousseau, ‘Discourse on the origins and foundations of inequality among men’, in The
Discourses, p.112-222 (146).
30. ‘As for myself, frightened by the increasing difficulties, and convinced of the impossibility
that Languages could have arisen and been established by purely humanmeans, I leave to
anyone who wishes to undertake it the discussion of this difficult Problem: which is the
more necessary, an already united Society for the institution of Languages, or already
invented Languages for the establishment of Society?’ (Rousseau, ‘Origins of inequality’,
p.149).
31. Beauze´e, ‘Langue’, in Encyclope´die, ou Dictionnaire raisonne´ des sciences, des arts et des me´tiers, par
une socie´te´ de gens de lettres, 17 vols (Paris and Neufchaˆtel, Briasson, 1751-1765), vol.9 (1765),
p.249-66 (252).
32. Mendelssohn, ‘Sendschreiben an den Herrn Magister Lessing in Leipzig’, in Gesammelte
between two incomparable categories to a minute gradual transition,
and the same point was made in Berlin by Johann Peter Su¨ßmilch in two
papers delivered at the local Academy of Sciences in October 1756
(published in 1766). The explicit target of Su¨ßmilch’s attack was the
president of the Berlin Academy, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis,
who had advocated the naturalist emergence of language in a lecture
delivered earlier that year.33 Su¨ßmilch was not disturbed by the potential
repercussions of his direct attack onMaupertuis’ Dissertation; the straight-
forward title of his essay was Versuch eines Beweises, daß die erste Sprache ihren
Ursprung nicht vom Menschen, sondern allein vom Scho¨pfer erhalten habe (‘An
attempt to prove that the first language had its origin only in the Creator
and not in man’).
Despite the theological connotations of the title, this was a shrewd
attempt to present a persuasive philosophical proof ‘from the realm of
nature’ against the naturalist–Epicurean theory.34 Su¨ßmilch included in
the printed edition numerous references to Rousseau’s Discours sur
l’ine´galite´ and appended to it a response to Mendelssohn. The main thesis
of the Versuch may be seen as a version of Rousseau’s conundrum
concerning language and reason: on the one hand language was the
sole means for the exercise of reason, but on the other its structure must
have required deliberate design by a fully rational mind. Hence language
could not have been formed by man, the only alternative being a higher
entity whose intellect did not depend on the use of signs.
Su¨ßmilch’s originality lay less in the argument itself than in the
ingenious employment of the naturalists’ own philosophical corpus in
his vindication of the divine origin of language. He was well aware that
modern thinkers drew on the Epicurean account of human evolution,
and mentioned Lucretius, Diodorus of Sicily, Vitruvius and Horace as its
main advocates. Su¨ßmilch summarised the Epicurean thesis as resting on
four tenets: men initially led a chaotic, rudimentary life; at this stage they
were speechless; they came together out of fear and for mutual defence,
beginning to communicate by natural signs and gestures; finally they
moved on to associate arbitrary signs with things, developing an exten-
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Schriften – Jubila¨umsausgabe, vol.2 (Schriften zur Philosophie und A¨sthetik II), ed. Fritz
Bamberger and Leo Strauss (Berlin, 1931), p.83-109.
33. Maupertuis, ‘Dissertation sur les diffe´rents moyens dont les hommes se sont servis pour
exprimer leurs ide´es’, in Histoire de l’Acade´mie royale des sciences et belles lettres, anne´e 1754
(Berlin, Haude & Spener, 1756), p.349-64. (Due to delays in editing and printing, recent
papers were sometimes incorporated into the proceedings of previous years. This is
the case for Maupertuis’ essay, delivered in 1756 but printed that year in the volume for
1754.)
34. Su¨ßmilch,Versuch eines Beweises, daß die erste Sprache ihren Ursprung nicht vomMenschen, sondern
allein vom Scho¨pfer erhalten habe (Berlin, Buchladen der Realschule, 1766), p.97.
sive language. The ancient theory, Su¨ßmilch observed, was revived by
Richard Simon who assumed that man did not receive a ready-made
language on his creation. This powerful argument enabled modern
philosophers, either of an atheist bent or committed to the defence of
religion to revive the Epicurean naturalist thesis. It now became possible
to embrace the biblical account of creation while simultaneously es-
pousing the natural emergence of language. In spite of his religious
vocation, Su¨ßmilch did not have much to say about the reconciliation of
Genesis with Epicurean prehistory. His main problem with this Enlight-
enment synthesis was similar to the one troubling Rousseau, the tran-
sition between two incommensurable categories: from natural signs such
as cries and gestures to arbitrary words. He identified the tendency to
stretch this transition over centuries or millennia as an ineffective
methodological device, observing that Lucretius and his followers
ascribed to ‘natural man’ too sharp an intellect for the communication
of thoughts he could not have had in the state of nature.35
Su¨ßmilch particularly criticised the Epicurean assumption that com-
mon needs and social interaction could have turned natural signs into
arbitrary words. If the original ‘language of action’ satisfied their initial
needs, what could have spurred the first human beings to improve their
means of communication? Habitude and comfort, Su¨ßmilch argued,
would have impeded any such attempt. If the Lucretian brutes had ever
existed, he concluded, they would have been far more content with cries
and gestures than the spoiled Europeans were with their articulate
language.36 Playing in the Epicureans’ arena, Su¨ßmilch mounted a
serious challenge to the naturalist theory of the origin of language.
More intricately than Rousseau, he demonstrated that the interdepen-
dence of signs and thought could be reclaimed as a central weapon in the
arsenal of the divine party. In line with Condillac and Christian Wolff’s
equation between language and reason, Su¨ßmilch argued that God must
have either bestowed them on man upon his creation or not bestowed
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35. Su¨ßmilch, Versuch, p.5-12, 58-59.
36. ‘If we suppose there had been Lucretian men on earth, who according to Horace could
not have been named otherwise than mutum et turpe pecus, it follows that they would have
not felt any other inclinations than those we perceive in animals. [...] And it cannot at all
be explained how further needs could have emerged among them, different from the ones
we still see in animals, against which the wisest creator of nature had given them [the
Lucretian brutes] resources and weapons’ (Gesetzt, daß es lucretianische Menschen auf
der Erde gegeben habe, die nach dem Horaz nicht anders als mutum et turpe pecus haben
ko¨nnen benant werden, so folgt von selbst, daß sie auch keine andre Triebe werden
empfunden haben, als die wir bey den Thieren wahrnehmen. [...] und es ist gar nicht
einzusehen, wie unter ihnen eine andreNoth ha¨tte entstehen ko¨nnen, als die wir noch bey
Thieren antreffen, wogegen ihnen der weiseste Urheber der Natur, Mittel und Waffen
gegeben hat (Su¨ßmilch, Versuch, p.88-90; my translation)).
them at all; in the latter case, human beings would have forever possessed
rudimentary, animal-like mental capacities. Philosophers arguing for a
natural emergence must have faced the conundrum of primacy and
decided what came first, reason or language, an impossible task accord-
ing to Rousseau, Beauze´e and Su¨ßmilch. The only alternative the Versuch
offered its readers was a supernatural launch of language, reason and
society at the same time – the beginning of time.
For Rousseau, there existed an unbridgeable conceptual abyss be-
tween the natural and the arbitrary. Beauze´e and Su¨ßmilch concluded
that, if human beings had initially lived without a full articulate language,
as portrayed in the Epicurean account, they would never have acquired
it. Animals and deaf-mutes usually supplied the requisite examples:
nothing natural, it was believed, could turn their crude means of com-
munication into a human language. This critical argument was actually
heeded by some advocates of the naturalist thesis. In an unpublished
essay, possibly drafted as a reply to Su¨ßmilch, Mendelssohn conceded
that if our original mental faculties were to be seen as merely bestial, the
divine origin of language would be vindicated. The only solution,
according to Mendelssohn’s modified view, was to assume man had a
hard-wired capacity for reason and language, activated by natural cir-
cumstances and developed by human means. The Lucretian brutes,
therefore, must have had a latent potential for language even if they
did not actually speak, just like human infants.37 Such an innate platform
for reason and language (‘Vernunftanlage’, as Mendelssohn called it) left
a theoretical door open both to intelligent design and to natural evol-
ution without direct divine intervention.
Innatism became increasingly influential in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. Its traces can be found, among other works,
in Herder’s famous prize essay on the origin of language (1771). The
assumption of an inborn instinct for language and reason could also
restore supernaturalism to its traditional prominence. If not literally
following the biblical account of Adam and his perfect language, the
innatist thesis implicitly suggested a divine answer to questions such as
how humans became endowed with a capacity for language and why they
were the only species to possess it. As the cases of Beauze´e and Su¨ßmilch
demonstrate, the answer was usually a synthesis between the divine
origin of innate faculties and their human self-activation. This was a
considerable shift away from the Epicurean history of language and
civilisation, where man was depicted as a chance creation emerging
naturally out of the earth alongside animals and monsters; one of
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37. Mendelssohn, ‘U¨ber die Sprache’, in Jubila¨umsausgabe, vol.6.2 (Kleinere Schriften), ed. Eva J.
Engel and Alexander Altmann (Stuttgart, 1981), p.3-23.
Epicurus’ main aims was to explain human emergence in a universe
lacking a supernatural masterplan.
Conclusion
The tension between nature and arbitrariness in language has been
preoccupying thinkers ever since Plato’s Cratylus, but in the Enlighten-
ment it had a particularly wide-ranging impact in other philosophical
domains. If the vogue for essays on the origin of language can be taken as
a guide, by the mid-eighteenth century the Epicurean history of civili-
sation had become well amalgamated with the biblical account of Cre-
ation due to the postulation of long ages of barbarism after the deluge.
After several decades of experimentation, however, the synthesis be-
tween Genesis and Epicurus ultimately failed to convince contempor-
aries that the transition from natural signs to conventional words could
be achieved smoothly and unproblematically. Attempts to resolve the
inherent tension in the Epicurean account stimulated a rich variety of
reflections while simultaneously exposing the contradictions involved in
the civilising process. Such paradoxes are particularly evident in
Rousseau’s efforts to reconcile nature and artifice in both language
and society.
The revival of the Epicurean history of language could perhaps be
portrayed as part of a general contemporary attempt to explain social
institutions, linguistic discourse and reason itself as man-made and
historically evolved. Far from possessing Adam’s wisdom, the first human
beings were considered categorically different from modern man, intel-
lectually resembling children and savages. Scriptural chronology was set
aside as a superfluous foreword to the Epicurean account, and even
advocates of the divine origin of language increasingly resorted to
arguments drawn from the arsenal of naturalists and materialists. Man
was to be reintegrated into nature, and the Epicurean history of language
and civilisation was an obvious means to realise this goal.
Yet such a picture would merely be the fac¸ade of the complex
appropriation of the Epicurean narrative. Orthodox thinkers could
freely apply Epicurean elements in their works, while some of the
adherents of the Epicurean thesis eventually became apprehensive about
the ancient naturalist theory (as manifest in Condillac and
Mendelssohn’s revision of their own account of the shift from a primor-
dial ‘language of action’ to linguistic convention). The frictions within
the Epicurean thesis consequently led to a reassessment of the ‘natural’
in language, simultaneously with similar changes in conjectural histories
of society. The resort to an innate linguistic capacity may have been the
cognitive counterpart of Adam Ferguson’s riposte to Rousseau’s con-
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undrum of nature versus arbitrariness. Emphasising the futility of any
reconstruction of a state of nature in which human beings were shorn of
all their historically evolved characteristics (including language),
Ferguson suggested that artifice was man’s nature from the outset. As
this instinct for artifice had always setmankind apart frompure nature, a
human state of nature never existed.38 Such a critique of the search for
ultimate origins implied that the first human beings could have already
possessed a fully fledged language, thus pre-empting a history of its
mental and social emergence.39
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38. Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the history of civil society (1767), ed. Fania Oz-Salzberger
(Cambridge, 1995), p.12.
39. I am grateful to Hannah Dawson, Knud Haakonssen, Neven Leddy and John Robertson
for invaluable comments on earlier versions of this article.
